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Dominating the relatively substantial literature on the history of the 
Chinese in New Zealand is the story of their mistreatment by white New 
Zealanders from the late 1860s through to the 1950s.1 However, the study of 
discrimination against the Chinese has now reached something of an impasse, 
one arising from the strong tendency of researchers in the area to advance 
their favourite explanations for discrimination without arguing why they 
prefer these to the alternatives. This practice has led to an increase in the 
variety of explanations and in the weight of data supporting the explanations, 
but not to their rigorous appraisal. In consequence, while researchers have 
told us more and more about which causal factors produced discrimination 
they have little debated or demonstrated the relative importance of these 
factors. As there is no reason to believe that all the putative factors are of 
equal importance, knowledge about the causes is not progressing.
 The object of this paper is to break the impasse by engaging in a systematic 
comparative evaluation of the different explanations to determine which one 
might be considered the best. The best explanation is, of course, not perfect 
by definition. Moreover, in all likelihood an even better explanation will 
consist of a combination of that best and one or more of the others. But 
to find the perfect explanation or a combination of explanations we have 
to start somewhere. Thus, the process of determining the best explanation 
of all that have been put forward so far is a crucial step, but only one of 
many, in the growth of knowledge. To improve upon existing explanations, 
we must first find the one with the fewest faults and the greatest strengths 
then build on it.2
 The paper begins with a discussion of the criteria to be used in 
comparatively evaluating the different explanations. It then sketches and 
appraises in turn the competing explanations that have been advanced for 
anti-Chinese feeling in New Zealand. Finally, it demonstrates why one is 
preferred above the others, but also identifies its weaknesses. For the most 
part, the focus will be on the explanations for the most visible forms of 
discrimination – the legal and institutional – and the collective protest that 
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often drove it. Very little is known about every-day expressions of prejudice 
against the Chinese – bullying, verbal abuse, ostracism and so on – because 
these were generally unrecorded.3 Historians have tended to assume that the 
causes they ascribe to the legal and institutional expressions of prejudice 
were very similar to the quotidian expressions. The assumption seems 
plausible given that New Zealand was a small-scale, relatively egalitarian 
society where the relations between legislators and ordinary voters were 
very close, after 1890 at least, and legislators were highly sensitive to mass 
opinion. But the assumption may not be true.
 Many criteria can be used for a comparative evaluation of rival theories, 
including the aesthetic, the moral and the epistemological. For historians, 
however, the prevailing tendency is to appraise explanations according to 
how far they conform to certain methodological rules. Although not often 
discussed in a theoretical manner, by convention the appraisals refer to such 
things as testability, logicality, the quality and quantity of the empirical 
evidence, and perhaps the degree to which the explanatory mechanism is 
specified. In this particular case, however, another criterion is emphasised: 
unifying or explanatory power. That is, the crucial test for the best 
explanation for anti-Chinese feeling is whether it is more useful, does more 
work, can solve more problems, than its competitors can. It should not just 
explain why discrimination occurred but also perform a greater number of 
other tasks related to the problem than do the rival explanations.
 In the first place, the best explanation should have more capacity than its 
competitors to account for comparable cases of discrimination that occurred 
elsewhere. Such comparable cases include Australia (especially the eastern 
colonies/states from the 1850s to the Great War), British Columbia in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and California from 1852 to 
about the 1880s. What makes these cases comparable is that they were all 
white settler societies; in all instances their Sino-phobia began when their 
respective gold rushes attracted considerable inflows of Chinese immigrants 
for the first time; much of their anti-Chinese legislation was similar and 
indeed was copied from each other; also, their Chinese immigrants came 
from the same part of China (the Pearl River delta region near Canton); 
and, as we shall be shown later, had remarkably similar demographic traits.4 
This is not to suggest that the cases are the same. Take collective violent 
protest against the Chinese during the gold-rush era: whereas forcible 
expulsions of Chinese from the gold-fields by white miners were very rare 
in New Zealand (which experienced about two such incidents) and British 
Columbia, about a dozen episodes occurred in Victoria and New South Wales 
in the 1850s and 1860s (including the infamous riots at Lambing Flat), and 
myriads in California from the 1850s to the 1880s.5 Another significant 
variation across the cases is the constitutional capacity of their respective 
governments: the New Zealand government and the Australian governments 
before federation had more authority to pass exclusionary legislation against 
Chinese immigrants than the British Columbian provincial and Californian 
state governments, the latter being constrained by federalism. Even so, 
there are sufficient similarities between the cases to test the power of the 
explanations for the New Zealand case by considering which are extendable 
to the other cases and which are not.
 In the second place, the best explanation will be defined as the one that 
accounts for more of the trends in discriminatory responses in New Zealand 
than the competing explanations. These trends consist of: a considerable 
degree of acceptance when Chinese immigration to the goldfields began 
in the late 1860s; a rising level of hostility and the rapid formation of a 
negative stereotype in the 1870s, culminating in the passage of the first 
discriminatory legislation in 1881; the hardening of attitudes from the 1880s 
to the 1920s, which was associated with the racialisation of the stereotype 
and the imposition of further legal disabilities; and finally the gradual 
easing of racism from the mid-1930s onwards, which manifested itself in 
the piecemeal abolition of the legal disabilities.
 The third way in which comparatively the explanatory power of the 
competing explanations will be assessed is by determining which of them 
accounts for the exceptions – that is, for the white New Zealanders who 
were not hostile to the Chinese. Although there is no real indication as 
to how many such colonists there were, we certainly know that at least 
some defended Chinese immigration, befriended the Chinese (a few even 
intermarried with them) or at least were indifferent toward them. James 
Ng’s close research has found obituary notices in local newspapers featuring 
former Chinese residents and paying tributes to them.6 A mark of the best 
explanation thus is that it possesses a superior capacity to account not only 
for the antagonism (perhaps expressed by the many) but also for positive 
and neutral sentiment (perhaps expressed by the few).
 In addition, the relative explanatory capacities of the different explanations 
will be appraised by determining which of them can account for the content 
of the negative stereotype of the Chinese (or can account for more of the 
content than other explanations). Thus the best explanation in this regard 
will account not just for the discrimination against the Chinese but also for 
the common beliefs that the Chinese carried infectious diseases, were dirty 
and unhygienic, unfairly undercut wages and prices, threatened to swamp 
the European population, engaged in gambling and opium smoking, sexually 
corrupted young European women, and were ‘locusts’ or parasites (lacked 
social duty, contributed nothing to New Zealand’s economic development, 
and were predators on New Zealand’s natural resources).7
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 Another criterion of a powerful explanation is that, unlike a weak one, 
it should be able to demonstrate why, although all non-white immigrants 
were subjected to discriminatory legislation, the Chinese were subjected to 
the most. Certainly, the Lebanese, Indians and other Asians, not just the 
Chinese, were excluded from state pensions until 1937; and all non-European 
non-British immigrants were subject to the reading test from 1907 to 1920.8 
Moreover, all non-whites regardless of whether they were British subjects 
were the target of the White New Zealand immigration policy introduced in 
1920. But the Chinese alone were banned from naturalisation (1908-1952); 
only the Chinese were required to have their fingerprints taken when entering 
and leaving the country (1900-1920); and only Chinese immigrants were 
the victims of the poll tax and tonnage restrictions (1881-1944).9
 Furthermore, a superior explanatory theory should be able to demonstrate 
why the discrimination did not go to extremes, had certain upper limits. For 
example, it would have to explain why, although the Chinese were ineligible 
for old age pensions, they were not disqualified from receiving the alternative 
to the pension, charitable aid, when elderly and infirm.10 It would also have to 
explain why, given the general racist climate the state fostered, the Chinese 
were not the victims of the most obvious forms of institutionalised racism: 
their rates of arrests, convictions and imprisonment, instead of being higher 
than those for the population as a whole, in fact were generally lower.11 
The state certainly maltreated the Chinese in many ways, but not to the 
point of persecuting them by, for example, seizing their property, punitive 
taxation, or sanctioning violence and disorder against them. Nor did it curb 
the considerable vigour with which they sued Europeans, testified against 
Europeans in criminal cases, and made formal protests about the poll tax 
and arbitrary action by goldfields’ wardens.12 Indeed, by the standards 
of other settler societies, New Zealand’s discriminatory legislation was 
relatively restrained. It chose not to follow the examples of British Columbia 
in 1874 and all the Australian colonies in the late nineteenth century in 
disenfranchising the Chinese.13 It did not forcibly repatriate the Chinese, 
in contrast to Transvaal that did this to its Chinese indentured labourers 
from 1910, and Queensland which did the same to its Kanaka (Melanesian) 
immigrant workers after 1906.14 Unlike nearly all the other Pacific rim settler 
societies, New Zealand did not legislate to prohibit or restrict the entry of 
the Chinese into any occupation or deny them access to government land.15 
It did not infringe the liberties of its Chinese population with curfew, pass, 
liquor and segregation laws, as did Natal with its Indian population and, to a 
lesser extent, Queensland with non-whites as a whole in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.16
 This leads us to the seventh criterion. Historians often suggest that the 
Lionel Terry case (1905) and the vituperative language applied to the Chinese 
indicate that they were hated and deeply feared by white New Zealand. But 
this is going too far.17 The Lionel Terry case is unique in the New Zealand 
context and vituperation was not uncommon in colonial public discourse.18 
Moreover, the vituperation was disproportionate to the way white colonists 
actually behaved towards the Chinese. The relatively restrained nature of 
anti-Chinese legislation and the virtual absence of collective violent protest 
against them scarcely indicate that the mass of colonists hated the Chinese. 
A more tenable inference from the behaviour would be to say that the mass 
of colonists was hostile to the Chinese and mistrusted them. Thus, what 
should distinguish an explanation with superior problem-solving abilities is 
that unlike its rivals it can explain why the level of anti-Chinese feeling 
while high was not extreme.
 The next criterion for differentiating a powerful explanation from one less 
powerful is its ability to account for the specific content of New Zealand’s 
discriminatory legislation. That is, it would not only have to account for 
the motives behind discrimination but also the specific mechanisms of legal 
discrimination.
 Finally, it will be suggested that the best explanation of discrimination 
will surpass its rivals if it makes sense of a greater number of important 
trends and events in New Zealand’s history. Indeed, we could go further and 
define the best explanation as the one that provides the most interpretive 
insight into ethnic relations or immigration history in general.
 Having laid out the criteria, let us now take all the competing explanations 
and see how well each measures up to them. There are seven altogether. 
The best explanation, it should be remembered, is not expected to tackle all 
the additional tasks successfully – that is asking too much – but to tackle 
more of them successfully than its rivals can.
 Let us start with what could be called the ‘swamping explanation’, the 
idea that behind the discrimination was the fear that hordes of Chinese 
would enter New Zealand, take control and become the dominant culture.19 
On the face of it, this seems an implausible explanation. For one thing, the 
proportion of Chinese in the total population was always tiny, peaking at 
around two per cent in 1871. For another, the Chinese population declined 
in both absolute and relative terms from the 1880s to the late 1940s. 
As against that, it should be remembered that racial intolerance is not a 
respecter of population size. Very small ethnic minorities have often been 
the butts of persecution. Eliminationist anti-semitism, for example, festered 
in Germany from the late nineteenth century, even though the Jews, the 
most assimilated in Europe, comprised only about one per cent of the total 
German population.20 In addition, Brian Moloughney and John Stenhouse 
state, quite rightly, that we must see the swamping issue in its own context, 
from the perspective of colonists. The fear of swamping was rational from 
Journal of New Zealand Studies What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese? 
 
 Another criterion of a powerful explanation is that, unlike a weak one, 
it should be able to demonstrate why, although all non-white immigrants 
were subjected to discriminatory legislation, the Chinese were subjected to 
the most. Certainly, the Lebanese, Indians and other Asians, not just the 
Chinese, were excluded from state pensions until 1937; and all non-European 
non-British immigrants were subject to the reading test from 1907 to 1920.8 
Moreover, all non-whites regardless of whether they were British subjects 
were the target of the White New Zealand immigration policy introduced in 
1920. But the Chinese alone were banned from naturalisation (1908-1952); 
only the Chinese were required to have their fingerprints taken when entering 
and leaving the country (1900-1920); and only Chinese immigrants were 
the victims of the poll tax and tonnage restrictions (1881-1944).9
 Furthermore, a superior explanatory theory should be able to demonstrate 
why the discrimination did not go to extremes, had certain upper limits. For 
example, it would have to explain why, although the Chinese were ineligible 
for old age pensions, they were not disqualified from receiving the alternative 
to the pension, charitable aid, when elderly and infirm.10 It would also have to 
explain why, given the general racist climate the state fostered, the Chinese 
were not the victims of the most obvious forms of institutionalised racism: 
their rates of arrests, convictions and imprisonment, instead of being higher 
than those for the population as a whole, in fact were generally lower.11 
The state certainly maltreated the Chinese in many ways, but not to the 
point of persecuting them by, for example, seizing their property, punitive 
taxation, or sanctioning violence and disorder against them. Nor did it curb 
the considerable vigour with which they sued Europeans, testified against 
Europeans in criminal cases, and made formal protests about the poll tax 
and arbitrary action by goldfields’ wardens.12 Indeed, by the standards 
of other settler societies, New Zealand’s discriminatory legislation was 
relatively restrained. It chose not to follow the examples of British Columbia 
in 1874 and all the Australian colonies in the late nineteenth century in 
disenfranchising the Chinese.13 It did not forcibly repatriate the Chinese, 
in contrast to Transvaal that did this to its Chinese indentured labourers 
from 1910, and Queensland which did the same to its Kanaka (Melanesian) 
immigrant workers after 1906.14 Unlike nearly all the other Pacific rim settler 
societies, New Zealand did not legislate to prohibit or restrict the entry of 
the Chinese into any occupation or deny them access to government land.15 
It did not infringe the liberties of its Chinese population with curfew, pass, 
liquor and segregation laws, as did Natal with its Indian population and, to a 
lesser extent, Queensland with non-whites as a whole in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.16
 This leads us to the seventh criterion. Historians often suggest that the 
Lionel Terry case (1905) and the vituperative language applied to the Chinese 
indicate that they were hated and deeply feared by white New Zealand. But 
this is going too far.17 The Lionel Terry case is unique in the New Zealand 
context and vituperation was not uncommon in colonial public discourse.18 
Moreover, the vituperation was disproportionate to the way white colonists 
actually behaved towards the Chinese. The relatively restrained nature of 
anti-Chinese legislation and the virtual absence of collective violent protest 
against them scarcely indicate that the mass of colonists hated the Chinese. 
A more tenable inference from the behaviour would be to say that the mass 
of colonists was hostile to the Chinese and mistrusted them. Thus, what 
should distinguish an explanation with superior problem-solving abilities is 
that unlike its rivals it can explain why the level of anti-Chinese feeling 
while high was not extreme.
 The next criterion for differentiating a powerful explanation from one less 
powerful is its ability to account for the specific content of New Zealand’s 
discriminatory legislation. That is, it would not only have to account for 
the motives behind discrimination but also the specific mechanisms of legal 
discrimination.
 Finally, it will be suggested that the best explanation of discrimination 
will surpass its rivals if it makes sense of a greater number of important 
trends and events in New Zealand’s history. Indeed, we could go further and 
define the best explanation as the one that provides the most interpretive 
insight into ethnic relations or immigration history in general.
 Having laid out the criteria, let us now take all the competing explanations 
and see how well each measures up to them. There are seven altogether. 
The best explanation, it should be remembered, is not expected to tackle all 
the additional tasks successfully – that is asking too much – but to tackle 
more of them successfully than its rivals can.
 Let us start with what could be called the ‘swamping explanation’, the 
idea that behind the discrimination was the fear that hordes of Chinese 
would enter New Zealand, take control and become the dominant culture.19 
On the face of it, this seems an implausible explanation. For one thing, the 
proportion of Chinese in the total population was always tiny, peaking at 
around two per cent in 1871. For another, the Chinese population declined 
in both absolute and relative terms from the 1880s to the late 1940s. 
As against that, it should be remembered that racial intolerance is not a 
respecter of population size. Very small ethnic minorities have often been 
the butts of persecution. Eliminationist anti-semitism, for example, festered 
in Germany from the late nineteenth century, even though the Jews, the 
most assimilated in Europe, comprised only about one per cent of the total 
German population.20 In addition, Brian Moloughney and John Stenhouse 
state, quite rightly, that we must see the swamping issue in its own context, 
from the perspective of colonists. The fear of swamping was rational from 
Journal of New Zealand Studies What Best Explains the Discrimination Against the Chinese? 
0 
their point of view, given that China was the most populous country in the 
world, that it had experienced a population explosion from the mid-eighteenth 
century, and that it had adapted to its population pressures through relatively 
high rates of emigration which in turn had created a large international 
diaspora.21 Furthermore, although the Chinese population in New Zealand 
fell after the early 1880s, it was also rapidly moving out of Otago into many 
other parts of New Zealand, thus becoming more visible.22
 A key fact supporting the swamping thesis is that three bursts of 
discriminatory legislation – 1881, 1888 and 1920 – occurred just after 
relatively sharp increases in the levels of Chinese immigration. Moreover, 
an advantage of the thesis is that it can account for a major image in the 
negative stereotype of the Chinese – the fear of swamping itself. In an 
obvious sense, furthermore, there is a broad causal relationship between 
anti-Chinese feeling and Chinese immigration since there would have been 
little or no anti-Chinese feeling without Chinese immigration.
 Yet there are some serious anomalies in the thesis. By the 1920s, the 
Chinese were living in about eighty boroughs and counties they had not 
lived in before the 1880s; yet as Charles Sedgwick has pointed out, there is 
no evidence of anti-Chinese feeling in most of these localities.23 A further 
anomaly is that anti-Chinese popular protest failed to occur in 1947 after 
one of the biggest short-term increases in the Chinese population took place, 
about 1300 Chinese (mainly refugees) on temporary permits being granted 
permanent residence, equal to about one quarter of the total New Zealand 
Chinese population at that time.24 Also, Charles Price’s comparative study 
of the settler societies in the Pacific rim shows that there is no simple 
relationship between the outbursts of Sino-phobia and fluctuations in the 
levels of Chinese immigration.25
 Apart from these anomalies, the swamping thesis has limited explanatory 
power. True, it seems to be able to explain most of the content of the 
discriminatory legislation, since with the exception of the pension ban the 
legislation was mainly concerned with limiting the inflow of Chinese. In 
addition, it can explain why the Chinese were subject to more discrimination 
than other non-European immigrants, given that they were the largest 
minority. But the thesis cannot explain the exceptions; the content of most 
of the negative stereotypes; the relative restraint of the discriminatory 
legislation; the fact that ill-feeling does not appear to have gone to extremes; 
and other important phenomena in New Zealand history.
 The next explanation, the oldest of the seven, is that discrimination was 
primarily caused by economic competition.26 Indirectly, the argument is 
consistent with extensive evidence that the Chinese did tend to undercut 
European wages and prices.27 The positive examples that support the 
argument are that anti-Chinese protest during the Otago gold rush era seems 
to have risen as the boom waned; that the peak of trade union protest against 
the Chinese occurred during the Long Depression (1879-1895); that much 
of the discriminatory legislation was passed during this period as well; 
and the study by Jacqueline Leckie of the outbreak of protest in Pukekohe 
against the Chinese in the late 1920s, showing that it was led by white 
market gardeners hurt by the cheaper prices of their Chinese counterparts.28 
In addition, economic downturn is associated with anti-Chinese collective 
protest in California in the 1870s, 1884-6 and 1893-6; and in Australia in 
the 1890s.29 A further virtue of the argument is its capacity to account for 
at least some of the exceptions. Although many Europeans would have been 
the losers from Chinese wage- and price-cutting, others of course would 
have gained from these lower wages and prices. Indeed some Europeans 
(notably employers) wanted Chinese immigrants precisely because they were 
a source of cheap labour.
 But there are many counter-examples to the economic competition 
argument. For a start, on the goldfields Chinese miners posed little 
competition to Europeans since they confined themselves to the ‘poor 
man’s diggings’ that Europeans generally avoided.30 Also, there is ample 
evidence that the segmented labour market and the relatively minute size of 
the Chinese labour pool minimised downward pressure on European wage 
and employment levels. The argument fails to account for the considerable 
number of Europeans who were not in economic competition with the 
Chinese yet were amongst their most vociferous opponents. Moreover, James 
Ng’s study of the Otago goldfields points out that in net terms the Chinese 
served the economic interests of European wage-workers. Although the 
Chinese undercut wages, they produced cheap vegetables and fruit that were 
otherwise in short supply; they did not compete with white employees for 
state support because they depended so little on state services; and they saved 
white workers from higher taxation because they generated more than their 
share of state revenue through customs revenue and the poll tax. The fact that 
almost no protest against the Chinese occurred during the great depression 
of the 1930s is another counter-example for the argument. Similarly, in the 
other Pacific rim countries, the relationship between economic trends and 
outbursts of anti-Chinese are not close: there are many examples where 
economic depressions and outbursts do not occur together and many where 
phases of economic growth and outbursts do occur together.31
 In response to these problems, Andrew Markus has modified the argument 
by claiming that what made white colonists hostile to the Chinese was not 
the actuality of economic competition but irrational fear of it – irrational 
because it was greatly exaggerated and largely groundless. Discrimination 
against Chinese immigration, he argues, was part and parcel of a defensive 
reaction by the labour movement against unemployment. It sought to restrict 
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 In response to these problems, Andrew Markus has modified the argument 
by claiming that what made white colonists hostile to the Chinese was not 
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because it was greatly exaggerated and largely groundless. Discrimination 
against Chinese immigration, he argues, was part and parcel of a defensive 
reaction by the labour movement against unemployment. It sought to restrict 
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the supply of people entering the job market, not only by preventing Chinese 
immigrants entering the country but also by curbing the participation of 
married women and the elderly in the paid workforce, government assisted 
immigration, the employment of minors, and so on.32
 The virtue of Markus’s explanation is its capacity to cohere with a major 
area of New Zealand history. Although not explicitly applied to New Zealand 
labour history, his explanation nonetheless enhances understanding of it, 
since the New Zealand labour movement in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had exactly the same preoccupation as its Australian 
counterpart: preventing unemployment by restricting the supply of people 
competing for work, including Chinese immigrants.33 That said, a major 
objection to Markus’s proposition is that it is not testable. Colonists might 
well have irrationally feared that the Chinese were undercutting their wages; 
but fear as a motive for action cannot be observed, particularly if possessed 
by dead actors, and if it cannot be observed, propositions about its existence 
are not empirically falsifiable.
 An additional objection is that if fear of Chinese economic competition lay 
behind the hostility towards the Chinese, then it is illogical that the hostility, 
and by implication the fear, occurred in several places where perception of 
competition might be expected to arise but did not. For example, protest 
against Chinese market gardeners arose in Pukekohe, but apparently not 
in several localities where there were also high concentrations of Chinese 
market gardeners, for example, Wanganui, Ohau, Levin and Oamaru.34
 Lastly, a major deficiency of Markus’s argument is that it fails to satisfy 
most of the outlined explanatory power criteria. Irrational fear of Chinese 
economic competition does not seem able to explain the exceptions; the 
content of most of the derogatory ideas about the Chinese; the change over 
time in attitudes; why there was more discrimination against the Chinese 
than against other non-European immigrants; why the discriminatory 
legislation had certain upper limits; the relative moderation of the ill-feeling 
towards the Chinese; and the specific content of the legislation (if fear of 
economic competition caused anti-Chinese feeling then why was none of 
the legislation concerned with keeping the Chinese out of the occupations 
where they allegedly posed the greatest threat to European job security?).
 A quite different – non-materialist – explanation for discrimination 
against the Chinese in New Zealand has recently been put forward by 
John Stenhouse and Brian Moloughney.35 They maintain that anti-Chinese 
feeling was driven by colonial nationalism. According to their argument, 
the antagonism was part of a general movement in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century New Zealand to eliminate elements alien to the colony’s 
identity as prosperous, socially just and egalitarian – God’s Own Country. 
Besides the Chinese, the enemies of the ideal society included Te Whiti 
and Rua, the large estate owners, the biologically unfit, Irish Catholics, 
conscientious objectors in the First World War, Red Feds and so forth. 
The great virtue of the colonial nationalist explanation, thus, is that it has 
the potential not just to explain prejudice towards the Chinese but also all 
kinds of other social movements at this point in New Zealand history.
 A relatively minor problem with the Moloughney/Stenhouse theory is that 
it is very thin. They impart no sense of the history of colonial nationalism, 
no indication of its antecedents, of when and how it first arose, and what 
key figures and institutions were responsible for the subsequent course of its 
development. A more serious problem is the logic of the theory. The authors 
inferentially deduce that colonial nationalism existed in people’s minds from 
its alleged consequences – the antipathy of colonists towards the Chinese, 
towards Maori separatists, Irish Catholics, the large estates and so on. But 
these outcomes do not entail colonial nationalism. Such behaviours could 
also imply that the elite (like elites anywhere) was preoccupied with social 
order;36 or that colonists wanted to preserve the purity of New Zealand as 
the Britain of the South.37 A related problem is that in its present form 
the theory does not appear to be testable. Taking parliamentary debates 
as their source, Moloughney and Stenhouse view colonial nationalism as 
consistent with such a wide variety of utterances that it is very difficult 
to think of any that could act as (to use Popper’s term) potential falsifiers 
to their argument. In Australia, perhaps the strongest indication of when 
colonial nationalism lay behind anti-Chinese feeling is where discrimination 
was justified with the slogan ‘Australia for Australians’.38 Yet the authors 
cite only one instance where the equivalent New Zealand slogan – ‘New 
Zealand for New Zealanders’ – crops up in the masses of parliamentary 
speeches on Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century.
 Like the other explanations so far discussed, the colonial nationalist claim 
fails to satisfy most of the explanatory power criteria. The authors talk at 
some length about the elements who defended the Chinese (notably the 
Christian humanitarians) but their colonial nationalist model does not have 
a logic which covers exceptions such as these. Furthermore, their theory 
seems unable to explain trends in attitudes over time; the specific content 
of any of the images in the anti-Chinese stereotype; why the Chinese 
were subjected to more intolerance than any other immigrant minority; 
why extreme measures were never taken against them; why the ill-feeling 
stopped short of mass hatred; and why the content of the discriminatory 
legislation took a certain form and no other.
 The next explanation is that hostility to the Chinese was ideological 
in origin, and that it sprang from the general climate of popular racialist 
ideas.39 The explanation is based on the assumption, which has become 
very fashionable with the rise of cultural history, that ideas are not simply 
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the outgrowth and expression of political, economic and social influences, 
but are independent of them and may even drive them. The virtue of this 
explanation is that it ties in with the general hardening of racial attitudes in 
western societies from about the 1880s, the consequence of the growth of 
scientific racism that claimed racial differences were immutable, that non-
European races were innately inferior, and the mixing of races injurious. 
The power of the ideas of scientific racism in the New Zealand context is 
evident in the published census of 1921. It devoted a whole section to the 
topic ‘Race Aliens’, introduced with the remarks ‘the population of the 
Dominion is, and always has been, of a high standard of racial purity’, 
that ‘the importance of racial purity has always been recognised’, and that 
‘history has shown that the coalescence of the white and the so-called 
coloured races is not conducive to improvement in racial types’.40 The 
tabulations of ‘race aliens’ included Chinese, along with other non-European 
‘races’ (exclusive of Maori, interestingly enough), irrespective of whether 
they were born in New Zealand, British subjects, or ‘half-castes’.
 However, up to the 1880s it is very difficult to say that anti-Chinese 
feeling was driven mainly, much less solely, by ideas about race. There is 
no evidence that racist ideas about the Chinese pre-dated the gold rushes in 
any of the Pacific rim white settler societies, or that prejudice towards the 
Chinese spilt over from the racist views of indigenous peoples in any of the 
same societies.41 It is possible that ideas about innate Chinese inferiority were 
carried to New Zealand, Australia and British Columbia by gold miners from 
California where, according to Charles Price, Chinese indentured labour was 
negatively associated with black slavery.42 But whether ideas about innate 
Chinese inferiority were transferred to New Zealand by this route has not 
yet been demonstrated. In other respects, the range of explanatory power of 
the theory is no greater than that of its competitors. It cannot explain the 
exceptions; the specific content of the derogatory stereotype of the Chinese; 
why the Chinese experienced more discrimination than other ‘race aliens’; 
the level of the antipathy; and the specific content of the discriminatory 
legislation.
 This leads directly to the sixth group of explanations, those suggesting 
what was crucial to the discrimination was the weakness of the Chinese 
state. China’s deep decline as a world power from the early nineteenth 
century made its people and their culture appear to be inferior, and, 
more importantly, prevented it from protecting its overseas subjects from 
discrimination.43 The key evidence usually cited for the weak Chinese state 
argument is that New Zealand government policy on non-white immigration 
tended overall to be more heavily biased against the Chinese than against 
the Indians or the Japanese. What made the difference, or so the argument 
runs, is that as the British and Japanese governments were stronger than 
the Chinese, they had more power to uphold the rights of their overseas 
subjects, and therefore the New Zealand government was more ready to 
listen to them than to the Chinese government.
 Robert Huttenback, however, in a comparative study of the immigration 
policies of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, has lodged a serious objection against this 
argument: in practice white settler governments took little heed of the protests 
by the Japanese and British governments over the treatment of their overseas 
subjects. They did not have to. Certainly, he notes, the British government 
had the constitutional authority to reserve immigration legislation passed 
by its self-governing colonies that it found repugnant. Moreover, it initially 
often took such action in response to protest by the Indian and Japanese 
governments against legislation that adversely affected their subjects. But 
the resistance by the British government to racist immigration legislation 
by its white settler colonies was token, minimal and brief. It accommodated 
itself to a huge variety of segregationist and exclusionist measures, for 
instance those taken by the Natal government against Indian immigrants. It 
encouraged (from 1897) white self-governments to adopt the deceitful policy 
(the reading test) that gave them the means to exclude non-white immigrants 
(even if British subjects) while appearing to treat all immigrants equally. It 
allowed the Australian Commonwealth Government to establish its White 
Australia policy in 1901, notwithstanding strong protests by the Japanese 
government, then an ally, and even though the policy violated the spirit of 
the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1894 that gave Japanese nationals the liberty 
to enter, travel and reside throughout the British Empire.44 Moreover, the 
British government ultimately conceded authority over immigration matters 
to the Dominions in 1917, despite knowing full well that they would use it 
to keep out non-white British subjects.45
 Besides all this, the weak Chinese state argument cannot explain why 
some colonists were not hostile to the Chinese; why the derogatory beliefs 
about the Chinese focused on particular images; why trends in attitudes 
changed over time in the way they did; why the hostility had certain upper 
limits; and why the legislation had a certain content.
 The explanations for discrimination considered so far have focussed 
on the role of Europeans. It has been recently argued, however, that this 
approach ignores the Chinese role; more specifically, that it ignores the 
effect of the peculiar nature of Chinese agency on relations between Chinese 
and Europeans.46 The agency approach can be divided into two claims. The 
first does not explain discrimination, for its concern is with the Chinese 
response to it, showing that they were not passive victims but adapted more 
or less effectively to discrimination.47 The second is that the Chinese had 
their own particular goals as immigrants, that these goals led them to be 
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exceptionally separatist and transitory, and that the exceptional separatism 
and transitoriness caused discrimination.48 It is this second claim that will 
now be examined in depth.
 To be sure, the Chinese were not uniquely separatist. Other immigrant 
ethnic minorities – notably the Hindus, the Lebanese, the Catholic Irish 
– also kept to themselves and were reluctant to give up many of their 
folkways. Moreover, the Chinese were by no means alone in being highly 
transitory. It is wrong to think of them as the only ‘sojourners’ in the 
population.49 A large proportion of the white gold seekers who poured into 
New Zealand during the 1860s had also left by the end of the decade.50 
There is extensive evidence, nevertheless, that the Chinese were both more 
separatist and more transitory than any other ethnic minority. This is not 
making an absolute claim, that they were the only separatist and transitory 
ethnic minority, but rather a relative claim, that they were the most separatist 
and transitory of all the non-European immigrant categories. The relative 
nature of the claim must be borne in mind when it is tested.
 The first piece of evidence is that the Chinese rate of out-marriage was 
extremely low, even by the standards of immigrant Indians and Lebanese, 
both categories renowned for their endogamy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. From the 1921 census it can be calculated that Chinese 
‘half-castes’ made up a mere 4.78 per cent of the total Chinese population. 
By contrast, Indian half-castes comprised 7.9 per cent of the total Indian 
population, the Lebanese 12.8 per cent of total Lebanese, and half-castes 
belonging to all other categories of ‘race aliens’ 90.4 per cent of the total 
of these other categories. Interestingly, the proportion of half-castes in the 
Chinese population rises until by 1945 it is three times the 1921 level, but it 
remained consistently lower than the proportions in the other categories.51
 A further piece of evidence that the Chinese were both exceptionally 
separatist and transitory is their massive gender imbalance. There was a 
strong tendency, of course, for every immigrant group to have an excess of 
males over females, especially amongst the first immigrant waves. But the 
Chinese gender imbalance was, on the whole, greater than that for any other 
ethnic group that migrated to New Zealand. Males made up over 99 per cent 
of the Chinese population in the 1870s and 1880s, as opposed to 70-80 per 
cent for the immigrant categories with the next highest proportions of males. 
By 1921 males still comprised over 90 per cent of the Chinese population, 
just beaten for first place by the Indian male population, about one per 
centage point larger, not unexpectedly so since Indian immigration was of 
more recent origin. The extraordinarily high ratio of males to females in the 
Chinese population, it should be noted, was not unique to New Zealand, but 
common to all the Pacific rim settler societies. For example, in Australia 
females born in China made up just 1.6 of the Chinese population in 1901, 
and in California as late as 1890 females comprised only 0.04 per cent of 
the Chinese.52 It should be noted, too, that the massive gender imbalance, 
although perhaps aggravated by the poll tax, was not fundamentally driven 
by it. The imbalance long pre-dated the poll tax, having been apparent right 
from the beginnings of Chinese immigration. It was, moreover, common to 
all occupations (labourers, professional men and merchants). Broadly, the 
pattern suggests that the Chinese chose to leave their wives at home since 
they intended to return there.
 Also symptomatic of the abnormally high degree to which the Chinese 
were oriented to their own culture and country is their extremely high return 
rate. As noted earlier, the New Zealand Chinese population dropped from 
the 1880s to the late 1930s.53 Their high return rate does not just reflect 
the intentions of Chinese as immigrants. It also suggests the differential 
effects of New Zealand’s restrictive immigration legislation, the legislation 
having a stronger bias against the Chinese than against any other category 
in the foreign-born population. It is very difficult, however, to allow for the 
bias, given that the Chinese restrictions were put in place in a piecemeal 
way over about four decades (1881-1920), and from a much earlier point 
than was the case with other non-Europeans. Even so, some idea of the 
relative magnitude of the Chinese return rate can be gleaned from American 
immigration data for the period 1899-1924, a time of comparative stability in 
American restrictive immigration legislation. Over those years, the number 
of Chinese who departed from the United States, each year, was on average 
equal to about 130 per cent of those who entered – as opposed to 80 per 
cent for the second highest return rate and an average of 30 per cent for 
all immigrants.54
 An additional manifestation of Chinese separatism is the remarkable 
contrast between their ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, terms coined 
by the American political scientist Robert Putman to refer to the associations 
within a category (bonding) and between different categories (bridging).55 
The Chinese in New Zealand, as in the other Pacific rim countries, formed 
extremely close ties with each other, based primarily on the clan. They used 
these ties to help each other to immigrate to the New World, for mutual 
aid, finding employment, raising capital, social control, forming business 
partnerships, work groups, and the like. The ties were not restricted to a 
locality, but were part of a dense structure of networks that extended back 
to China itself and embraced the whole Chinese diaspora.56 In sharp contrast 
to these powerful bonds, the Chinese had minimal bridges with Europeans. 
To quote James Ng on the Otago Chinese:
When one reads the newspapers of the time it is only too obvious how 
separate the Chinese remained. Europeans took part in town or rural 
affairs, in mining, hospital and school committees, and in sports and 
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effects of New Zealand’s restrictive immigration legislation, the legislation 
having a stronger bias against the Chinese than against any other category 
in the foreign-born population. It is very difficult, however, to allow for the 
bias, given that the Chinese restrictions were put in place in a piecemeal 
way over about four decades (1881-1920), and from a much earlier point 
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all immigrants.54
 An additional manifestation of Chinese separatism is the remarkable 
contrast between their ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, terms coined 
by the American political scientist Robert Putman to refer to the associations 
within a category (bonding) and between different categories (bridging).55 
The Chinese in New Zealand, as in the other Pacific rim countries, formed 
extremely close ties with each other, based primarily on the clan. They used 
these ties to help each other to immigrate to the New World, for mutual 
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partnerships, work groups, and the like. The ties were not restricted to a 
locality, but were part of a dense structure of networks that extended back 
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to these powerful bonds, the Chinese had minimal bridges with Europeans. 
To quote James Ng on the Otago Chinese:
When one reads the newspapers of the time it is only too obvious how 
separate the Chinese remained. Europeans took part in town or rural 
affairs, in mining, hospital and school committees, and in sports and 
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militia and cultural activities, but not the Chinese. The only sports 
activity I read involving Chinese and Europeans together was one episode 
of kite-flying in Naseby (in 1872), and Chinese race events at Cardrona 
and at the Lawrence Christmas sports day in 1879 and 1880 . . . .
 They seldom intermarried and only with partners from as modest a 
social background as themselves. They preferred working with their own 
countrymen, preferably kith and kin, seldom entered into partnership with 
Europeans, and rarely hired European employees. Thus the Chinese did 
not form a significant degree of interlocking relationships with Europeans, 
in family, community, business or leisure . . . . As aliens outside the 
commonalty of interest, despite their good qualities, they laid themselves 
wide open to the charges of being ‘useless’ (as permanent settlers) and 
‘jackals’ and ‘locusts’. One of the few ways they did participate in 
community affairs was to donate to local causes, notably the annual 
fund-raising for hospitals which they used themselves.57
Finally, what indicates that the transitory and separatist tendencies of the 
Chinese were unusually strong is their low rate of literacy in English (only 
2.0 per cent and 13.5 per cent could read and write English in 1881 and 
1901 respectively); their low levels of land ownership (0.45 per cent in 
1882 as opposed to 50 per cent for all adult males in the New Zealand 
population); and their limited uptake of naturalisation (a total of only 488 
took the opportunity between 1852 and 1907, equal to just 20 per cent of 
the 1906 Chinese population).58
 It is possible, of course, that all these actions were adaptive responses 
to the hostility expressed towards the Chinese by the white majority. For 
instance, they may have left their wives behind and failed to commit 
themselves to the new society in the belief that whites would never let 
them make New Zealand their home. Yet, though the hypothesis cannot be 
ruled out, it would, if true, only partly account for Chinese separatism and 
transitoriness, for the Chinese were exceptionally separatist and transitory 
in every Pacific rim society, before as well as after the imposition of 
discriminatory legislation, and regardless of how badly or violently they 
were treated. The key reason they acted in this way is that they emigrated 
not to colonise, to reproduce their own culture at a better living standard, 
but rather to make enough money to allow them to support their families 
back in China and eventually to return home at a higher level of status. To 
quote Charles Price, ‘Their hearts and permanent homes [were] back in the 
family lineage country of the Pearl River Delta’.59
 The unusually strong separatist and transitory traits of the Chinese 
generated hostility in two respects. In the first place, as Charles Price 
has explained, the traits made them less willing and able than any other 
ethnic minority to fit in, to assimilate. In consequence, they antagonised 
the European majority to an exceptional degree because they went further 
in refusing to modify the elements of their way of life which Europeans 
found offensive and irritating. Often cited examples include their opium 
smoking and gambling, their lack of social duty, their lack of competence 
in English, and ‘heathen’ religion. According to some historians, Europeans 
were particularly sensitive to these refusals, coming as they did from 
societies which did not have strong pluralistic traditions and were intolerant 
of difference (for instance, the attitudes of the English towards Roman 
Catholics). The Chinese regarded themselves as belonging to a superior 
civilisation.60
 The other mechanism that produced bad relations between the Chinese 
and white settlers was the outcome of Chinese extreme transitoriness.61 
Although not invoked by historians of the Chinese in settler societies, 
their transitoriness created a classic instance of what games theorists in 
the philosophy of social science variously call the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, 
the ‘free loader problem’, the ‘problem of public goods’, the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’, or a ‘deficiency in social capital’.62 The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ is 
a model of the paradox that results when self-interest is rationally pursued 
in a collective setting. The point is neatly illustrated with Garrett Hardin’s 
parable of the tragedy of the commons. The story starts with the problem 
that the common land of the village is overgrazed. Consequently, it is in 
the self-interest of every villager to co-operate to solve the problem; namely, 
by agreeing with all the other villagers to reduce his or her stocking rate. 
However, every villager has an incentive not to agree to reduce the number 
of stock he or she grazes. Why? Because every villager knows that if he or 
she does reduce his or her rate, it is in the self-interest of the other villagers 
to take advantage of this action and increase their own rates. Therefore, 
paradoxically, it is not in the rational self-interest of any villager to agree 
to reduce his or her stocking rate.
 The prisoner’s dilemma for the Chinese and Europeans stemmed from 
the exceptionally high rate of Chinese re-emigration. The Chinese had no 
incentive to collaborate with Europeans because they knew they would 
probably not be around to receive the benefits; and Europeans had no 
incentive to collaborate with the Chinese because they had no confidence 
the Chinese recipients would be around to return favours. Instead, both sides 
mistrusted the other, each knowing it could exploit the other on first contact 
since there would probably be no subsequent contacts at which paybacks 
could be made. To put this in a counterfactual way, had there been frequent 
contact between the Chinese and Europeans (an iterative prisoner’s dilemma), 
Chinese and white settlers would have been able to engage in reciprocity, 
to co-operate to their mutual benefit, with, say, the Chinese agreeing not to 
under-price their labour and the whites agreeing to let the Chinese enter the 
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country on the same terms as everyone else. In other words, the argument 
is that the bad relations between Chinese and Europeans were inherent in 
the situation. They would have arisen with any foreign migrant labour force 
with an equally high rate of geographical mobility, though not necessarily to 
the same degree. Indeed, a very similar situation did arise with permanent 
transient rural labourers and the settled core in localities in the late colonial 
period, stimulating a general crackdown by the authorities on vagrancy.
 Is the argument that has just been advanced the best explanation for 
discrimination against the Chinese in New Zealand? It seems so, mainly 
because it has more explanatory and unifying power than the rival 
explanations. To begin with, it also fits the cases of Australia, British 
Columbia and California: they have the same pre-conditions and outcomes 
as the New Zealand case. Just as in New Zealand, so in these locations too 
the Chinese were not only exceptionally transitory and separatist but also 
subjected to a high level of discrimination. In addition, given that on average 
the Chinese were more separatist and transitory than other ‘race aliens’, 
the theory solves the problem of why the Chinese were more oppressed 
than other ethnic out-groups, notably the Indians and the Lebanese.63 As 
well, the argument can account for many of the exceptions: the instances 
where Europeans respected and accepted the Chinese. James Ng’s research 
suggests that these instances frequently occurred where Europeans knew 
individual Chinese who had settled permanently in the same locality and/or 
had adopted European ways of life. In other words, what made European 
exceptions were Chinese exceptions – Chinese who were much less separatist 
and transitory than most of their peers.64
 On top of this, the explanation has some potential to explain the two key 
trends in attitudes towards the Chinese; that is, the hostility from the 1870s 
to the 1920s, and its waning from the mid-1930s. The hostility correlates 
with a long period of minimal assimilation and high return rates. The 
waning coincides with the attenuation of these factors. From the 1920s the 
New Zealand Chinese were increasingly cut off from their homeland and 
forced to develop ties to New Zealand as a result of the internal upheavals 
in China, the civil war, the Japanese invasion in 1937, war in the Pacific, 
and the communist takeover in 1949.65
 Moreover, the explanation can account for much of the content in the 
derogatory stereotype of the Chinese. True, it cannot account for the image 
that the Chinese were swamping New Zealand. But it explains the belief that 
the Chinese had no sense of ‘social duty’ (which was generally true in respect 
to their relations with Europeans, but quite untrue in respect to themselves), 
also convictions that the Chinese engaged in unfair economic competition 
with Europeans. It explains the perception of Chinese preoccupation with 
gambling and opium smoking (also largely true, arising from the Chinese 
refusal to assimilate European norms). More indirectly, it explains why the 
Chinese were believed to be corrupters of young European women, their 
massive gender imbalances inevitably giving rise to this suspicion. Equally, 
the primitive and congested accommodation that the Chinese were often 
prepared to accept as the price for achieving their goals as immigrants, 
might have given some foundation to the European belief that the Chinese 
were dirty, unhygienic and carriers of disease. Finally, the theory has the 
capacity to fit a major theme in New Zealand history – the nature and 
development of its social cement, including atomisation from the 1850s to 
the 1880s and the development of social capital thereafter.
 However, the theory that discrimination against the Chinese was caused 
by the extraordinary attachment the Chinese had to their own culture and 
country is not a perfect theory. Although it can satisfy more of the seven 
explanatory power criteria than competing theories, it by no means solves all 
of the problems. For one thing, it cannot account for the specific content of 
the discriminatory legislation. For another, it does not seem able to account 
for the full extent of the hostility expressed towards the Chinese. Their 
high levels of separateness and re-immigration undoubtedly created mistrust 
between themselves and Europeans; but arguably the negative feelings that 
Europeans had towards the Chinese were stronger than mistrust.
 In conclusion, this paper has attempted to provide a framework for the 
comparative appraisal of explanations for Chinese discrimination. It has 
also tried to show that the best explanation for discrimination is that the 
Chinese had a far more powerful orientation to their home country and their 
culture than any other migrant group. Why the Chinese were different in this 
respect is not something which the paper has sought to explain. This is a 
matter that can only be addressed through a systematic comparative analysis 
of the cultural backgrounds of the various non-European ethnic minorities 
that migrated to New Zealand, and such an analysis will not proceed until 
historians abandon their present habit of examining the Chinese and other 
ethnics in isolation from each other. Given that the Chinese were different, 
their history in New Zealand cannot be properly understood until they are 
studied in a comparative context.
 1 Charles Sedgwick, ‘The Politics of Survival; a Social History of the Chinese in New 
Zealand’, PhD thesis, University of Canterbury, 1982, p.2 reports that until that date the 
settlement of the Chinese in New Zealand had attracted three books, 31 theses, and 25 
articles. Relevant recent works include: James Ng, Windows on a Chinese Past: How the 
Cantonese Goldseekers and their Heirs Settled in New Zealand, Vol. I, Dunedin, 1993; 
and vol. II, 1995; James Ng, ‘The Sojourner Experience’, in Manying Ip (ed.), Unfolding 
History; Evolving Identity; the Chinese in New Zealand, Auckland, 2003; B. Moloughney 
and J. Stenhouse, ‘ “Drug-besotten, Sin-begotten Fiends of Filth”: New Zealanders and 
the Oriental Other, 1850-1920’, in New Zealand Journal of History (NZJH), vol.33, no.1, 
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